AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



CUBA AND ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. 



BY 



JAMES MORTON CALLAHAN, Ph. T>., 



'< - A/c^: ^ >^. L 



From the Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1897, pages 193-215.) 



WASHINGTON: 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 

18 9 8. 



AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



CUBA AND ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. 



BY 



JAMES MORTON CALLAHAN, Ph. D., 

PROFESSOR, HAMILTON COLLEGE. 



From the Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1897, pages 193-215.) 



WASHINGTON: 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 

18 98. 



*M9 

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XV —CUBA AND ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. 



By JAMES MORTON CALLAHAN, Ph. D., 
PROFESSOR, HAMILTON COLLEGE. 



HIST 97 13 193 



CUBA AND ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. 



By James Morton Callahan. 



During the decade after the negotiations which resulted in 
the cession of Florida to the United States the political 
destiny of Cuba was a subject of great international interest. 
During that period Cuba was the point of departure for expe- 
ditions of Spain to reconquer her revolted colonies and to re- 
gain her power over the land of the mighty Cordilleras. When 
all of Spain's otber American possessions were falling away 
from her it was not certain whether in the course of events 
Cuba would find it convenient to refrain from breaking the 
bonds which had held her to tbe mother country for three hun- 
dred years. Her large slave population made the question of 
her independence different from tbat of the South American 
states and Mexico, where the new governments found it prac- 
ticable to emancipate the slaves. It was doubtful whether she 
could maintain her independence unless under the protection 
of some other power. If she remained a possession of Spain 
she was open to attack from Mexico and Colombia as long as 
Spain persevered in the attempt to subdue those new states. If 
she should be conquered by Mexico and Colombia her destiny 
would still have been uncertain. Her position was such that 
her fate was a subject of especial concern to the United States, 
as well as to England, neither of which desired to see her fall 
into the hands of the other. 

During this period the United States Government was fre- 
quently made uneasy by the reports that England had designs 
on Cuba. As early as the summer of 1819, when the execution 
in Florida of the two British subjects, Arbuthuot and Am- 
brister, and the subsequent treaty for the cession of Florida 
to the United States were being discussed in London it was 
hinted that England was likely to aim at Cuba. The news- 
papers said the Duke of San Carlos made the declaration that 

195 



196 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 

it was about to be added to the British colonial possessions. 
Mr. Bush, the United States minister at London, asked Lord 
Gastlereagh concerning the reports, but Castlereagh intimated 
that he knew nothing of any propositions. Lord Liverpool 
referred to the newspaper rumors as idle. Onis, who had 
recently represented the Spanish Government at Washington, 
was at London in June and said Spain had not ceded Cuba to 
England and did not intend to do so. The sentiment among 
the ambassadors at London was that the powers would not 
allow any cession of Cuba, and the newspaper rumors not 
generally credited. 

It was surmised, however, that the British Government was 
using its influence to prevent the Spanish ratification of the 
Florida treaty. The Duke of San Carlos declared that it 
would be ratified, but there was much delay which created 
unrest in America as to the policy of both Spain and Great 
Britain. The British papers continued to count upon getting 
Cuba in case Florida was delivered to the United States. 
They stated that England should have it as an equivalent for 
injury which the British interests had received by the cession 
of Florida, and as a station by which to command the coast 
of the United States and oppose the progress of American 
aggrandizement. 

The negotiations between London and Madrid were involved 
in mystery, but the newspapers from time to time announced 
that England had revived the proposal to obtain Cuba. It 
was a common subject of conversation at Madrid. 

It was urged by the British journals that British trade in 
the Gulf of Mexico would be exposed in case of a future war 
with the United States, and that English dominion on the 
ocean was threatened by the growing strength of the Ameri- 
can Republic. J. Freeman Rattenbury, in a series of articles 
in the Morning Chronicle, pointed out how Florida strength- 
ened the American Union by firmly uniting the West to the 
Atlantic States, which, to him, seemed a step to further at- 
tempts at conquests. He said the United States watched 
with a quick and inquiring eye every movement of their oppo- 
nents, and were ready to seize a favorable moment to appro- 
priate nourishment " to the hungry appetite of their ambition ; " 
and that it was necessary for England to have Havana for a 
depot of naval thunder to awe their enterprising competitor, 
and to give greater security to Canada. In case Spain would 



i 



f 



CUBA AND ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. 197 

not favor the cession of her precious possession, he urged co- 
ercion as a matter of self-defense, stating that the "apologists 
for the seizure of the fleet at Copenhagen could not want an 
excuse for this equally necessary violence." 

The empire of Spain was falling to pieces. She had played 
a losing hand in two hemispheres, and President Monroe felt 
that she would soon be expelled from her former strongholds 
on the American continent, and that the United States could 
arrange the boundary with Mexico to include more territory 
than would probably be safe for our internal peace. Jefferson 
felt confident that Florida would be ours whether Spain ratified 
the treaty or not, and he thought that Cuba would probably 
join us voluntarily. He ventured to predict that the day was 
not far distant when we might "formally require a meridian 
of partition through the ocean which separates the two hemi- 
spheres, on the hither side of which no European gun" should 
ever be heard to threaten the peace which in thinly-populated 
America was necessary for producing men. 

Spain finally ratified the Florida treaty and American terri- 
tory was extended toward Cuba, so that the destiny of that 
island became more important to the United States than it 
had ever been before. The interest felt as to its future con- 
dition soon found expression in various ways. In February, 
1822, Forsyth, the American minister at Madrid, expressed his 
conviction to one of the members of the political commission 
of the Cortez that Spain, by recognizing the independence of 
Colombia and Mexico, and by a liberal system of commerce, 
could procure a guaranty of Cuba from the United States, 
Mexico, and Colombia, since each of these powers preferred 
to see it held by Spain rather than fall into the hands of 
England or any other power. At this time there were fresh 
reports of British overtures to Spain. The French minister at 
Washington had recently stated that the British, in their 
negotiations for Cuba, had offered to give Gibraltar and a 
large sum of money. Similar news came from other sources. 
In April Senator De Wolfe, of Khode Island, was alarmed, 
because he thought England would have possession of Cuba 
in another month. For a year after this date the attitude of 
Great Britain toward Cuba was a subject of frequent discus- 
sion and concern. 

The future political condition of their island had become a 
subject of deliberation among the Cubans. In 1820, when the 



198 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 

discord in Spain had resulted in the reestablishinent of the 
constitution of 1812, it was also proclaimed in Cuba. But the 
Spanish authorities in Cuba adopted the policy of restricting 
the liberal movement there. In 1821 the Cubans were talking 
of independence. In September, 1822, a number of the inhabi- 
tants of Havana sent a secret agent to notify the United. States 
Government that plans were matured for Cuban independence 
and that they only wanted the assurance that they would be 
seconded by the, United States in case they declared their 
independence without aid from the United States and then 
sought admission into the Union. In the discussion which 
arose at a cabinet meeting Calhoun expressed anxiety to get 
Cuba as a part of the United States in order to prevent the 
dangers of its re volution by negroes and its possession by Eng- 
land; but, as we were not then ready to riska war with England, 
which the annexation of Cuba might have occasioned, he 
advised that the Havana overtures should be answered by 
persuading them for the time to adhere to Spain. He thought, 
however, that there could be no more objection to our acqui- 
sition of Cuba than to the purchase of Louisiana. J. Q. Adams 
did not agree with Calhoun's policy. He saw an ocean between 
Florida and Cuba which made the question of Cuba different 
from Louisiana. He said that if the taking of Cuba by us 
should lead to a war, it would for a long time result iu British 
possession of the island. He favored a policy of strict moral 
duty to Spain; and he thought it best to give no advice to the 
Cubans, but simply to say that the executive was not compe- 
tent to promise the admission into the Union, and that our 
relations to Spain would not allow us to encourage such a pro- 
posal. At the same time, he stated that we might mention our 
friendly sentiments, and the "■ common interests which point 
to intimate connection between Cuba and the United States." 
The policy of Adams was adopted. 

Forsyth felt that the uncertainty of affairs as to Cuba would 
give England an opportunity to get a foothold in that quarter 
by which she might command the Gulf of Mexico and obtain 
the communication between the oceans at the Isthmus of 
Darien. Spain needed reinforcements in the Gulf of Mexico 
to protect Cuba from Mexico and Colombia; she also had some 
fears that Cuba would declare itself independent and place 
itself under the protection of the United States. At such a 
time Great Britain might have been able to get Cuba as a lien 






CUBA AND ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. 199 

on loans to Spain, or by. agreeing to guarantee it against any 
designs of the United States. There was a possibility of a 
change of conditions in Cuba which might have induced Spain 
not to resist a British offer for cession. Both England and 
France had political agents there watching the course of 
events, and perhaps giving them direction. In December, 
1822, there was considerable popular expression in England 
favoring an attack upon Cuba. There is not evidence that 
this represented the views of the cabinet, though Secretary 
Canning did not see reason to disavow it in his conversation 
with Mr. Gallatin. Forsyth had informed the Spanish Gov- 
ernment that as English property Cuba would be injurious to 
the United States; and this feeling was strengthened by time. 

In January, 1823, there was a report that Great Britain had 
agreed to supply Spain with money in case of a war with France 
and hold Cuba as a mortgage. But Mr. Canning, the British 
minister at Washington, called upon Secretary Adams and 
read a letter from his cousin, George Canning, in which the 
latter denied that England desired Cuba. This caused Adams 
to state publicly that England had no designs on that island. 
England sent some troops to Jamaica early in 1823, but they 
were probably for the purpose of guarding British interests in 
Hayti. It was explained at Washington that if any English 
force went to Cuba it would be for the purpose of protecting it 
from the French, who might attempt to take it in case of war 
with Spain. According to the Paris journals, the British Gov- 
ernment did make some kind of agreement to prevent French 
invasion of Cuba; but in February, when Forsyth asked the 
Spanish minister at Madrid whether there was local force suf- 
ficient to defend Cuba in case of an attack by the French, he 
was assured that Spain relied upon her own resources and 
upon the United States for security. 

It was very difficult in 1823 for the United States Govern- 
ment to determine what its policy toward Cuba should be. 
Some of the English journals stated that the United States 
bad long wanted Cuba, and that England should occupy it if 
she wanted to save her West India trade; but it does not 
appear that there had been any general desire to acquire Cuba 
except it should become inconvenient to do otherwise. On 
the other hand, there was a growing feeling that it should not 
pass into the hands of Great Britain. It may have been, as 
Chateaubriand said in the French assembly, that England 



200 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 

could not have taken Cuba without making war upon the 
United States. Clay told Adams that we would fight for 
Cuba should England attempt to take possession. Some 
Members of Congress were decided upon the same policy. 
Adams was not certain that a war could prevent England 
from any designs which she might have on Cuba, and he 
therefore thought it a good policy to keep cool. The restriction 
of the liberal movement in Cuba, together with the reports 
that Spain might not be able to hold it, led to the organization 
of various secret societies on the island. About the beginning 
of 1823 some of these Cuban liberalists sent an agent (Morales) 
to Washington to sound the Government upon the course it 
would pursue in case Cuba should declare her independence. 
Poinsett, who had been in Mexico and Cuba in the service of 
the Government and had talked with many of the most influ- 
ential characters in Cuba, was satisfied that they did not 
favor any change unless there should be some radical altera- 
tion of the constitution; bat he believed that, in case the 
Spanish constitution should be radically changed, they would 
ask for protection of the United States and admission into 
the Union, and he said if the United States rejected them 
they would probably apply to England. C. J. Ingersoll wrote 
to Mr. Bush, our minister at London, that it was a momentous 
question for the decision of our country — and that while 
much might be said against annexation, he had long thought 
"that whenever Cuba presents herself without any forcing or 
maneuvering on our part we must e'en take the good the gods 
provide us." Monroe, about this time, spoke of Cape Florida 
and Cuba as forming the mouth of the Mississippi. 

The Western people did not want to see Cuba possessed by 
England; the Southern people did not desire to see it inde- 
pendent without slavery; the Northern people did not desire 
to see Cuba annexed with slavery. 

In March, 1823, at a cabinet meeting, Mr. Thompson favored 
urging the Cubans to declare independence if they could 
maintain it, but Adams was sure they could not maintain it. 
A month later European affairs caused Adams much anxiety 
as to the future of Cuba. He felt that the United States was 
not yet prepared for the adoption of a policy of annexing ter- 
ritory beyond the sea, but he was satisfied that if Cuba should 
fall to the United States by the law of political gravitation, 
we should not cast her from our bosom, and that annexation 



CUBA AND ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. 201 

might become necessary. He saw that Spain could no longer 
hope to hold Cuba if the Spanish constitution was overthrown 
by the armies of the Holy Alliance, and that since Cuba was 
incapable of self-government she must necessarily be depend- 
ent upon either England or the United States. In case Eng- 
land should get a hold on Cuba by aiding Spain, he believed 
it would be unpropitious to the interests of our Union. 

In June, Mr. Miralla, a native of Buenos Ayres, who had lived 
in Cuba several years, while visiting Jefferson said that the 
sentiment of the Cubans was opposed to their country falling 
into the hands of England, and that they would resist it. He 
stated that if events should lead them to desire independence, 
they would desire the protection of Mexico or the United 
States — opinion was divided as to which they would prefer. 

Through authentic channels Mr. Monroe learned that the 
Cubans felt that they could not maintain their independence 
by themselves — for, in addition to the danger of being molested 
by foreign powers, they feared that in case of separation from 
Spain the black population would attempt to secure control of 
the government. Monroe saw that to England they could only 
become a colony; he believed that a connection with Colom- 
bia could be of little use to them owing to the distance; and 
he said that connection with Mexico was less desirable than 
incorporation into the United States, to which they were more 
contiguous. He did not think it best to encourage the Cubans 
to seek independence. Through organs in which he had con- 
fidence, he advised them to cling to Spain as long as possible 
and to resist by force any attempt of England to take posses- 
sion. 

While it appears that there was a general feeling that the 
cession of Cuba to England would have produced an attempt 
at independence, and might have resulted in a slave insurrec- 
tion, there was not so much certainty that the majority of the 
people would have turned toward the United States. French 
merchants from Havana who were fellow-passengers with our 
minister to Paris, said that the people of Cuba disliked our 
conduct in Florida before 1819, our early recognition of the 
Spanish-American States, and our modes of traffic, which led 
many of them to call us a " nation of cheats." 

There were in 1823, and thereafter, several causes of friction 
with the Spanish authorities in Cuba. Partly on account of 
our sympathy with the Spanish colonies in revolt, the governor 



202 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION- 

of Cuba had refused to admit a consul or commercial agent 
from the United States, and the necessity for one was daily 
becoming more urgent. Our commerce was receiving great 
injuries from the pirates, and the authorities in Cuba had been 
unable to suppress them. In the early part of 1823 the United 
States sent a special agent to Cuba to receive the Florida 
archives, and to urge the authorities to cooperate with our 
naval force to stop piracy, but in 1824 there had been no resto- 
ration to the security of our commerce in the vicinity of Cuba, 
and the pirates seemed to find sympathy among the Cuban 
people and authorities. In January, 1821, the committee on 
foreign relations in the House of Representatives considered 
the advisability of an act of Congress authorizing the Presi- 
dent to blockade Cuba and Porto Rico as a measure of defense 
or retaliation, but it was finally decided to first call on the 
Spanish Government for a remedy. The next December Mr. 
Randall, an agent of the Government, returned from Havaua 
and urged the absolute necessity of some remedy for pro- 
tection. In January, 1825, Congress again considered the 
necessity of suppressing the piracy around Cuba. A bill 
was reported favoring the building of new vessels, the landing 
forces in fresh pursuit of pirates, authorizing a blockade under 
certain circumstances, making limited reprisals on offending 
vessels, and permitting merchant vessels to arm for defense. 
Barbour refreshed his memory on Jenkins's ear, and said that 
the hundreds of dead invoked immediate action. The blockade 
was generally opposed, but many favored lauding in Cuba to 
repress pirates and to make reprisals. No two members on 
the committee of foreign relations could agree upon a policy. 
Forsyth did not want to invade Cuba or take any step which 
we could not allow England to take. He favored this policy 
not because he loved Spanish neighbors more, but because he 
desired English neighbors less. At various times after this 
date both England and the United States claimed and exer- 
cised the right of pursuiug pirates who had taken refuge on 
the coast of Cuba. 

In 1825 the London Courier described Cuba as the "Turkey 
of transatlantic politics, tottering to its fall, and kept from 
falling only by the struggles of those who contend for the 
right of catching her in her descent." Spain, Great Britain, 
and the United States were all uneasy as to its fate. France 
was ready to succor Cuba if conditions required it, but Eng- 



CUBA AND ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. 203 

land objected. The United States was anxious, and Mexico 
was alarmed at the report that France probably intended to 
invade Cuba. Mexico asked the United States to fulfill her 
pledge of December 2, 1823. 

Cuba was the Spanish base of supplies for the war against 
Mexico and Colombia, aud the latter had resolved to strike at 
this stronghold while it was weakly garrisoned, but both Eng- 
land and the United States objected to their proposed inva- 
sions, and by their interposition probably were the means of 
preserving Cuba to Spain. In October, 1824, Canning, in a 
conversation with the Mexican agent, spoke of the danger of 
a slave insurrection which might result from such an invasion. 
The attitude of Canning doubtless had some influence in caus- 
ing the abandonment of the expedition which was in prepara- 
tion under Santa Anna at Campeachy in the spring of 1825. 
In June, 1825, when the Mexican agent returned from England, 
Canning, who had heard of Santa Anna's proposed proclama- 
tion to the negroes of Cuba, informed the agent that the British 
Government not only opposed the possession of Cuba by 
France and the United States, but would also be displeased 
at any attack upon it by Mexico or Colombia. In November, 
1825, he informed Hurtado, the Colombian agent, to the same 
effect. Hurtado was at this time urging the British Govern- 
ment to renew its efforts for peace. A month later he stated 
to Canning that Colombia "could not continue to see with in- 
difference the enemy retain a possession at which it might con- 
tinually collect armaments and thence direct expeditions 
against Colombia and its allies," and he referred to the neces- 
sity of joining Mexico in an attack against Cuba. Canning 
admitted that as belligerents they had a right to attack their 
enemies and capture their possessions, but added that they 
"ought to remember that this warfare might be very preju- 
dicial to England by causing an insurrection of the blacks, and 
by the pretext which it offered to other nations to interfere in 
the affairs of Cuba, and perhaps to forcibly occupy the island." 
Thus Colombia was dissuaded from an expedition which, it 
was afterwards declared in the British Parliament, might have 
been advantageous to her at that time. 

The United States also used her influence to prevent a 
change in the political condition of Cuba. She was not dis- 
posed to interfere with Cuba's "present actual state" — for its 
ports were open, and its cannon silent and harmless while 



204 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 

Spain bad possession; but tbere was no desire to see it pass 
to Colombia or Mexico, wbo might not be strong enough to 
resist the attempts which other powers might make to secure 
it. The United States had been among the first to hasten to 
acknowledge the independence of these new States, and had 
served their cause of independence by her neutrality, but she 
did not desire to see their power become too great, and she 
was especially anxious that the immediate fate of Cuba should 
not be left in great uncertainty. So the Government at 
Washington feared the results that might come from Spain's 
useless attempts to subjugate her revolted colonies. At a 
cabinet meeting on May 7, 1825, the condition of Cuba was 
considered critical*. There was at that time some preparation 
for the invasion of Cuba from Mexico, and the piracies around 
Cuba were liable to continue so long as the war between Spain 
and her colonies should continue. On May 10 Clay directed 
our minister at St. Petersburg to ask the Eussian Government 
to urge Spain to recognize the independence of Colombia and 
Mexico in order that she might not also lose Cuba and Porto 
Eico. At the same time Clay advised Colombia and Mexico 
to abstain from any hostile expedition, and again in the fol- 
lowing December he asked them to suspend any expedition 
which they might have in view against Cuba. Hurtado, the 
Colombian agent at London, at the close of 1825, said that the 
state of the population of Cuba was favorable to an attack by 
his state and Mexico, but the Spanish Government did not 
consider that Cuba was then in any great danger. Mr. 
Everett, the American minister at Madrid, admitted that 
Cuba seemed satisfied to remain connected with Spain. 

The idea of cooperation between the United States and 
Great Britain in a policy concerning Cuba had been several 
times suggested, and finally became a subject of correspond- 
ence between the two governments. In March, 1823, when the 
cabinet was considering the possibility of England getting 
Cuba, the question arose as to whether it would not be wise 
to propose to England to join the United States in a mutual 
guaranty of Cuba to Spain. A difficult question arose as to 
whether the guaranty should be of such a character as to 
prevent the island from becoming independent, and whether 
Spain would agree to it if it did not include this provision, 
and wV other England would favor it. It was agreed, however, 
that tne United States should not make Great Britain any 



CUBA AND ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. 205 

mutual promise not to take Cuba. A short time after this, 
Jefferson suggested to Monroe that a mutual guaranty of 
Cuba to Spain might be made. Monroe wrote to him concern- 
ing the difficulty which stood in the way of such a policy. In 
June Jefferson again wrote to Monroe that if the United States 
could induce England to join in a guaranty of Cuba's inde- 
pendence tl against all the powers except Spain it would be 
nearly as valuable as if it were our own." A few days later, 
after having a talk with Mr. Miralla, who had lived in Cuba 
for several years, he wrote that the interests of England did not 
seem to be as strong as those of the United States in Cuba, 
and that we need not join that power in a guaranty. In Sep- 
tember, 1823, when France was threatening to reconquer the 
Spanish colonies whose independence the United States had 
recognized, Mr. Erving, our minister at Paris, feared we would 
have to act in unison with England, and yet he was not cer- 
tain that it would not be better to abandon the colonies than 
to form an alliance with England. 

At this very time Canning was proposing to Rush at Lon- 
don that the two countries join in a declaration that they did 
not aim at the possession of the Spanish colonies for them- 
selves, and would not with indifference see them transferred 
to any other power. Jefferson, who was opposed to entangling 
ourselves with the broils of Europe or in allowing Europe to 
meddle in cisatlantic affairs, was nevertheless pleased that 
England had suggested cooperation, and he thought we should 
accede to her proposition — even to join in a declaration that 
we did not aim at the acquisition of any of the Spanish pos- 
sessions — though he still thought Cuba would be a valuable 
acquisition to our Union if it could be gotten without a war. 
In the cabinet meeting of November 7 Calhoun was inclined 
to think that the declaration against the interference of the 
Holy Allies would be to our advantage, even if it should pledge 
the United States not to take Cuba or Texas, since England's 
power to seize was greater than ours. But Adams, without 
discussing the expediency of annexing Cuba and Texas, 
thought we should be free to act as emergencies arose, and he 
said that the proposed joint declaration would be a pledge 
against ourselves; for, while we had no intentions of play- 
ing a game of grab, the inhabitants of Cuba and Texas might 
"exercise their primitive rights" and sock incorporation into 
the United States, and that they would not seek annexation 



206 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 

to England. Adams believed that Canning's main object at 
this time was to get a pledge from the United States that 
would prevent her from acquiring any of the Spanish-American 
territory. 

Both England and the United States agreed that Spain 
should recognize the independence of Mexico and Colombia, 
and that neither of these two new States should obtain con- 
trol of Cuba. In 1824, before England herself had recognized 
their independence, Canning offered Spain to guarantee her 
the possession of Cuba if she would recognize the independ- 
ence of Mexico and Colombia, but Spain declined. In the 
spring of 1825 Clay, in a conversation with Addington, the 
British minister at Washington, agreed that it could hardly 
accord with the views of the English and American govern- 
ments to allow Cuba to fall into the hands of Mexico or Colom- 
bia, and it was suggested that if Spain continued the war it 
might be necessary to establish an independent government in 
Cuba under the joint guaranty of the United States and Great 
Britain, and " perhaps some of the Spanish-American States." 
This encouraged Canning to believe that the United States 
would enter into some sort of an arrangement to guarantee 
Cuba to Spain. 

When Bufus King went as minister to London in the sum- 
mer of 1825, the United States was anxious that Bussia, Eng- 
land, and France might be induced to influence Spain to mate 
peace with her revolted colonies in America by acknowledging 
their independence. TheUnited States Government had writ- 
ten to Bussia to use her influence for peace, but Canning 
said there was no hope from that source. He told King 
that some action should be taken without waiting for Bussia, 
and he thought that the first step should be to remove the 
Spanish suspicions as to the great powers. During the sum- 
mer the French Government had given orders to the authorities 
of Martinique to send troops to Cuba if necessary to put down 
any internal disturbance. Canning had at the time given the 
French to understand that sending troops to Cuba would be 
considered as taking part in the war, and afterwards the fear 
that French soldiers would misconstrue orders and take pos- 
session of Cuba had weighed heavily on his mind. He told 
King that when he went to bed at night he could feel no 
assurance that morning might not bring news that the French 
force had landed at Havana "in consequence of some orders 



CUBA AND ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. 207 

hastily given for contingencies ill defined." He said that the 
United States and England should take prompt steps to guard 
against this danger; that wbile Spain feared that the United 
States or England would take Cuba from her, she did not have 
the same fear of France, and that she was thus liable to call 
France to her aid in case a panic arose as to the intentions of 
the United States or England. France, as well as England and 
the United States, had already disclaimed any desire to get 
possession of Cuba, and Canning said France would hardly re- 
fuse to concur with England or the United States in a written 
disavowal. He therefore proposed either the signature of three 
joint ministerial notes, or of one tripartite note, in which each 
of the three powers should disclaim any intention of occupy- 
ing Cuba, and should protest against such occupation by the 
others. After such an agreement he thought Spain would 
be willing to consent to a suspension of hostilities, and thus 
prevent any remaining danger to Cuba from Mexico and 
Colombia. 

Mr. King suggested that the omission of any mention of 
Mexico and Colombia might cause an immediate invasion of 
Cuba by them, giving rise to questions which would throw the 
whole West Indies into disorder and perhaps excite much 
anxiety in the southern part of the United States. Canning, 
in reply to this, said it would be wise not to mention anything 
in the tripartite note that might be construed by Spain as a 
threat to induce her to make peace with her colonies, or as 
a menace to Cuba. How, then, could Mexico and Colombia be 
mentioned 1 ? Should the note say that they " shall not do what 
we will not do?" 

The draft which Canning prepared also provided that the 
landing of small parties from friendly ships of war in pursuit 
of pirates was to be allowed in aid of the local authorities in 
Cuba, but such landing was to be with consent of the local 
authorities, unless it should be at places where it was incon- 
venient to cooperate in this way. 

In proposing the tripartite arrangement to France Canning 
expressed the determination of Great Britain not to take Cuba 
nor suffer its appropriation by the other two great powers. 
Though France gave some encouragement at first, she would 
not agree to sign. Canning was willing to sign with King 
alone, but the latter had already referred the matter t<> Ins 
Government. When Canning learned that King had sent 



208 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 

their correspondence to Washington, he was very uneasy lest 
the United States Government might decide to publish it. 

Spain at this time may have been urging England for a 
pledge as to Cuba. In September, a member of the Spanish 
Government suggested to Mr. Everett that the United States 
might be able to obtain a consul or a public agent in Cuba if 
she would by treaty guarantee the Spanish possession of that 
island. Mr. Everett replied that such a guaranty would be 
inconsistent with the American policy ; that the United States, 
merely to get a consul, could not run the risk of a war which 
might be necessary to insure Cuba to Spain. 

When the draft of the tripartite arrangement reached Wash- 
ington, in October, Clay decided that Canning's policy of sooth- 
ing Spain and leading her to be unsuspicious of "our united 
councils" would not contribute to the great object of stopping 
the war. If Spain felt that Cuba was safe, she might be the 
stronger resolved to continue the war. Clay thought it would 
be better to let Spain speculate upon the possible dangers to 
Cuba, or to let her feel that if Cuba declared its independence 
the powers would guarantee it, than to lull Spain's apprehen- 
sions as to any possible contingencies which might threaten 
her West Indies in case the war was continued. It seemed to 
Clay that Canning's real object was not to end the war, but 
to quiet the suspicions of the powers as to each other. 

Mr. Clay informed King that the President saw no objec- 
tion to acceding one or the other of Mr. Canning's proposi- 
tions — the three separate ministerial notes or the one tripartite 
note — but he would give no instruction till he heard from the 
Emperor of Russia. He said, however, that the pacific policy 
of the United States really made her declaration unnecessary, 
and that it was not apprehended that Great Britain would 
"entertain views of aggrandizement in regard to Cuba, which 
could not fail to lead to a rupture with the United States." 
As to France, he hoped she would "equally abstain from a 
measure fraught with such serious consequences, though he 
realized that there was some danger of her getting into Cuba 
by a pretext of assisting distracted Spain to quell some dis- 
turbance. When Clay received King's letter stating that 
France had declined to accede to the tripartite arrangement, 
he decided that it was no longer necessary or proper to con- 
sider the subject, but he stated that after the friendly commu- 
nication between the British and American governments "each 



CUBA AND ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. 209 

must now be considered as much bound to a course of forbear- 
ance and abstinence in regard to Cuba and Porto Rico as if 
they had pledged themselves to it by a solemn act." With the 
hope that France would abandon her designs on Cuba if she 
had had any, Clay wrote to Brown, the American minister at 
Paris, to say to the French Government that he could not sup- 
pose that any European power would attempt to occupy Cuba 
without the concurrence or knowledge of the United States. 

The efforts to get Spain to agree to stop the war against her 
former colonies were unsuccessful, though the United States 
continued to urge Russia to prevail upon Spain to make peace 
at once if she desired to retain Cuba and Porto Rico. While 
the United States did not desire any change in the possession 
of Cuba, and had recommended that Colombia and Mexico 
suspend their proposed military expeditions, she informed 
Russia, in December, 1825, that she did not see any justifiable 
ground on which to interfere with another expedition in case 
Spain obstinately continued the war, and that she could inter- 
pose only in case the excesses of a race war should threaten 
her own shores. 

Mr. Everett, still at Madrid, contemplated the uncertainty 
of the immediate future, and decided that the surest plan to 
stop the inconvenience which the United States experienced 
at her doors was to get Cuba peacably at once — obviating the 
risk of broils with Europe, which might arise by getting it 
later. On November 30, 1825, he wrote President Adams that 
his informal conversation with the Spanish minister gave him 
some hope that the rjecuniary needs of Spain would induce her 
to give Cuba as security on a loan from the United States. He 
did not think that Great Britain could have reason to take 
umbrage at this, and he suggested that in case Spain did not 
repay after a reasonable length of time the complete sover- 
eignty of Cuba might vest in the United States. It does not 
appear that Adams favored this plan of his enthusiastic pupil. 

Though the American Government had not accepted the 
tripartite proposal, it was anxious to secure some guarantee 
against the foreign intervention of other powers in Cuba. At 
the beginning of 182G Mr. King, by instructions from Wash- 
ington, was endeavoring to have Canning send a formal com- 
munication to the French Government, stating that Great 
Britain would "not consent to the occupation of Cuba or Porto 
Rico by any other European power than Spain under any cir- 
hist 97 11 



210 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 

cumstances whatever." But Canning replied that in the pre- 
vious July, before the tripartite proposal, he had communicated 
with France precisely to this effect, and that by repeatiug it 
he would appear to be acting at the suggestion of a third 
power, and subsidiary to it, in a step which he had already 
taken alone. 

The feeling that a change in the political condition of Cuba 
was imminent, is reflected in the debates in Congress in the 
spring of 1826. In 1823 there had been a suggestion that the 
United States should dig a canal across Florida in case Eng- 
land took Cuba. The uncertainty as to Cuba now led to a 
revival of this suggestion. A bill was introduced in Congress 
to provide for the survey of such a canal. Randolph opposed 
the bill as unconstitutional, and it was urged that such a canal 
would protect southern interests in case Cuba should pass into 
the hands of a first-class naval power. In reply to this Ran- 
dolph said: "If all constitutional restraints are to be pushed 
aside let us take Cuba and done with it." There was consider- 
able discussion outside of Congress at this time in regard to 
this proposed canal. It was seen that a friendly understand- 
ing with the government which should direct the policy of 
Cuba would always be important to the United States, but it 
was hoped that with the canal across Florida Cuba would be 
less regarded as a military station and as an asylum for 
pirates. 

The American policy toward the proposed Panama congress 
was largely connected with the Cuban question. Forsyth said 
that the destiny of Cuba was the great object of the Panama 
mission. Although all the new Spanish-American States had 
abolished slavery, the United States had not hesitated to 
recognize their independence, but there was no desire to see 
any extension of their principles, which might endanger the 
slaveholding interests in the United States. It was espe- 
cially desired that no negro republics should be created in the 
Caribbean Sea. The political constitution of the government 
of Hayti had kept the United States from acknowledging 
the independence of that island. An invasion of Cuba and 
Porto Rico was stated to be an object of the Panama con- 
gress. It was seen that such an invasion might lead to in- 
ternal convulsions and a servile war, which would endanger 
the institutions of the Southern States, President Adams, 
who favored sending delegates to Panama, urged the point 



i 



CUBA AND ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. 211 

that by representation there we might be able to discourage 
any project that might threaten to disturb or change the ex- 
isting condition of Cuba. In both March and April 1820 the 
subject was discussed in Congress. Buchanan said that while 
we were warning England and France, we also should have 
warned Mexico and Colombia against the occupation of Cuba. 
He favored the mission to Panama as a step in averting an 
attack upon Cuba. Brent, of Louisiana, feared it was too late 
to stop the blow from Campeachy Bay, where Santa Anna had 
partially organized an expedition. He would have favored the 
independence of Cuba except for the danger which it might 
bring to the Southern planter. Those who opposed the mis- 
sion did not all act from the same principle. Webster said it 
was unconstitutional. He thought, however, that we should 
not be cold toward the new American States. He appears to 
have had greater fear of the transfer of Cuba to England, in 
which case he held that we would have a right to interfere in 
self-defense. Forsyth favored a strictly neutral policy. He 
stated that self-preservation compelled us to anxiously watch 
over Cuba. He desired to see Spain hold it, but he opposed 
any interference against the rights of Mexico and Colombia to 
conquer it in order to end the contest with Spain. He said 
that we should avoid any political connections which might 
result in wars and burdens on our people, and that we should 
not interfere on either side except for self-preservation. Ham- 
ilton, of South Carolina, feared a Mexican invasion of Cuba 
more than any European possession of it. He stated that a 
cession of Cuba to England could not be near so dangerous 
to the United States as the erection of a second Carthage or 
Hayti " to shadow our shores." He believed that Spain might 
cede Cuba under circumstances where it would be folly for us 
to interfere, and he said that it was not a wise policy to change 
Monroe's mere declaration as to the continent into a pledge as 
to Cuba, which we might be called upon to fulfill. Mr. Floyd 
said that England had interests in the West Indies. Mr. V. 
Johnson did not agree that it would be better for Cuba to pass 
to England than to Mexico, but he did not favor any alliance 
with the new Spanish- American States. As to our Cuban 
policy, he said it was against our principles and interests to 
take possession of Cubaorauy other colony, but that we should 
deny the right of either England or France to take territory 
not contiguous to thein and so near to our own shores. 



212 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 

It was not till in May or June that news reached Washing- 
ton that the Mexican expedition against Cuba had been aban- 
doned. In the meantime the United States kept urging Eussia 
and Spain to hasten the peace. Spain endeavored to get the 
United States to guarantee Cuba to her, but the Government 
at Washington continued to decline to agree to any proposal 
to that effect, stating that the condition of the United States, 
England, and France was almost equivalent to an actual 
guaranty. England and France knew that the United States 
would not consent to their possession of Cuba, and Spain was 
assured that the forbearance of the United States could be 
relied upon. 

In May, before it was certain what immediate course Colom- 
bia and Mexico would take, Clay, in instructing the delegates 
to Panama, stated that neither of these two new powers had 
the supplies necessary for a conquest of Cuba; that the United 
States could not see a desolating war there, and that action 
should at least be suspended until news should arrive from 
Europe. Clay doubtless had other reasons than those men- 
tioned which prompted him to discourage the threatened 
attack. Might there not be danger of Cuba becoming a bone 
of contention between these two new States "? When the Mexi- 
can minister at London, in a conversation with Mr. Gallatin, 
intimated a desire that Cuba should be united to Mexico, 
Gallatin suggested the danger of a war between Mexico and 
Colombia, during which Great Britain might claim the right 
to conquer Cuba as well as the two contestants. He also 
stated that the United States would be decidedly opposed to 
Cuba becoming a British colony, and might find it difficult to 
maintain this opposition and at the same time acquiesce in an 
attack by one of the American States. 

In his conversation with Gallatin the Mexican minister to 
London was led to speak of the propriety of making Cuba 
independent under the just guaranty of all the American 
states and Great Britain. Mr. Gallatin favored the plan, and 
wrote Clay that it was "the only one which could give a 
permanent security to the United States." Mr. Gallatin could 
not speak with authority as to the intentions of his Govern- 
ment, but he suggested to the Mexican minister that "if his 
Government thought this to be a practicable object, that Cuba 
was ripe for it, and that it could be done without disturbing 
the state of society in reference to the black population, they 



I 






CUBA AND ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. 213 

might make an overture to the Government of the United 
States and get its views." 

Gallatin at once resolved to get Canning's views concerning 
the ultimate destination of Cuba. At this time it was not 
certain that there would not soon be a war between England 
and Spain, and there had been a recent report that England 
intended to occupy Cuba. Gallatin suggested to Canning that 
complications in Anglo-American relations might result from 
an Anglo-Spanish war — and that this was especially probable 
as to Cuba, which it was understood should not fall into the 
hands of either England or the United States. He also stated 
that the United States and Mexico could not submit to a trans- 
fer of Cuba, and asked whether it would probably go to Mexico 
or Colombia, or whether the whites were strong enough to 
maintain its independence, in case it should not be practical to 
keep it under the Spanish rule as had been previously desired. 
Canning was cautious and reluctaut to speak. He said Eng- 
land already had too much territory, but he gave no positive 
assurance that his Government had no designs on Cuba. His 
reserve may have been partly due to the failure of his proposed 
tripartite agreement of the year before, concerning the details of 
which Gallatin was not informed. It appears that the sug- 
gestion of the Mexican minister received no further considera- 
tion. 

In 1827 there was a report that British emissaries were 
preparing the way for the independence of Cuba under English 
protection. In June of that year the Spanish minister at 
London informed his government that the British had recently 
sent a frigate to the Canaries with commissioners to investigate 
what preparations were being made for an expedition against 
the new Spanish- American states; that they also went to 
Havana where they found many disposed to revolt; and that 
they left emissaries in Cuba ''to guide public opinion" so that 
the people would ask for British protection in preference to 
that of the United States. It was supposed that this would 
lessen the chances of objection by the United States in case 
the occasion for British protection or interference should pre- 
vail. The Spanish ambassador stated that he had his infor- 
mation from the Duke of Wellington, who had advised a 
British officer to give immediate information of any signs of 
disaffection which he should see in Cuba. In August Mr. 
Everett notified Mr. Clay of the information which he had 



214 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 

privately received, and which seemed to indicate that the 
British ministry was planning a revolution in the Canaries 
and Cuba. The news gave Clay some uneasiness. In Decem- 
ber, Everett called the attention of the Spanish Government 
to the report, and was informed that everything was secure in 
Cuba. Everett suggested that Spain should keep the United 
States better informed in matters relating to Cuba, and stated 
that the British could not cover their operations by disguises. 
The British at this time were still desirous of preventing any 
attack upon Cuba or Porto Rico by Mexico or Colombia. 
During the year Bolivar had gathered ships and forces at 
Caracas for a contemplated invasion of Porto Kico; but Mr. 
Cockburn, the British minister to Colombia, energetically dis- 
couraged such an attempt against any of the Spanish islands, 
and frustrated the plans of Bolivar. 

The indemnity treaty which Spain made with Great Britain 
and France lessened the possibility of their interference in 
Spanish affairs, but the United States Government felt that it 
did not entirely obviate the danger of their attempting to 
occupy Cuba. In 1829, Mr. Van Buren, Secretary of State, 
instructed Van Ness, the new minister to Madrid, to watch for 
any events which might lead to a change in the condition of 
Cuba, and stated that while it was not the American policy to 
give a direct promise to guarantee Cuba to Spain, he believed 
the United States would be ready to prevent any blow which 
might threaten Cuba, or any objectionable project which might 
affect the affairs of nations engaged in American commerce. 
The unsuccessful expedition which Spain sent from Cuba to 
Mexico in 1828 was a cause of some solicitude to the American 
Government. Mr. Van Buren stated that although the Gov- 
ernment had preserved Cuba to Spain when Mexico and Colom- 
bia were ready to strike a blow, and although the possession 
of Cuba by these new states might give England or France a 
chance to get it, yet the United States could hardly interfere 
with a defensive attack which Mexico or Colombia might think 
it to their interest to make — unless such attack should threaten 
to disturb the internal condition of the island, or result in 
measures which would tend to excite the slaves to revolt. By 
1830, when Mexico was again threatened by an attack from 
Spain, the English Government also ceased to offer any objec- 
tion to a Mexican defensive expedition against Cuba. 

Spain was forced by her weakened condition and by popular 



CUBA AND ANGLO-AMERICAN EELATIONS. 215 

sentiment at home to discontinue her attempts for the recon- 
quest of her former colonies on the American continent, though 
she did not recognize their independence for several years after 
the war closed. The international complications which might 
have arisen if Spain had been able to continue the war were 
thereby avoided, and both England and the United States 
were satisfied at that time to see the " Queen of the Antilles" 
remain in the hands of the nation that had depleted her treas- 
ury in the vain attempt to retain half of the American 
continent. 



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